It is a conundrum that has long intrigued philosophers, novelists, lawyers, and ordinary citizens: a captured terrorist knows the location of a ticking bomb that threatens hundreds of innocent lives; the only way to prevent the mass murder is to torture the terrorist into disclosing the bomb's location; there is no time for reflection; a decision must be made. Does the noble end of saving innocent lives justify the ignoble means of employing torture?
We know, of course, what all governments would actually do under these conditions of tragic choice: they (or more precisely, some flack-catching underling) would torture (with the implicit approval of the powers-that-be). But could the government justify it? Would they write a law expressly authorizing such means? Or would they choose the “way … of the hypocrites: they declare that they abide by the rule of law, but turn a blind eye to what goes on beneath the surface” (R.,78).